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Abstract: From the Second World War onwards European political integration is 
based on the assumption of a common cultural heritage and the memory of the 
Holocaust. Yet, does such a mutual heritage and collective memory really exist? 
Notwithstanding the common roots of European culture, Europe’s nations share 
most of all a history of war and confl ict. Nonetheless, the devastating horrors of two 
World Wars have for the last six decades stimulated a unique process of unifi cation. 
Millions of fallen soldiers, the mass slaughter of European civilians, and the 
destruction of the Jews have determined, by an act of negation, Europe’s postwar 
humanist identity. Politics of memory and forgetting play a crucial role in this 
process. Yet, I will argue that after the Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) the assumption 
of the Holocaust as a common European experience, and hence as a basic part of 
Europe’s postwar identity, raises some critical objections. The Holocaust Paradigm 
will be challenged by a new ‘Double Genocide’ or Occupation Paradigm, resulting 
in a deep incompatibility of opinions between Western and Eastern Europe people 
about the impact, interpretation and meaning of the World Wars and the Cold War. 
This will ask for completely new interpretations, integrating (and confronting) very 
diff erent twentieth century European experiences, and a fundamental rethinking of 
postwar politics of memory.
On a quiet day at 2.00pm on the 10 June 1944 German 
SS troops marched into the beautiful small village of 
Oradour-sur-Glane, near the city of Limoges. Without 
warning they started to herd together the 700 villagers, 
men, women and schoolchildren under the typical 
Nazi shout ‘fast, fast, hurry up!’ Men and women were 
separated, the women and children transported to 
the village church and the men lined up at the village 
square, after which they were split up and brought to 
sheds, a garage, and a wine cellar. Hours later, at the 
sign of a bomb explosion, the torture started when 
SS soldiers started to shoot with machine guns at the 
legs of the men, after which they were heaped on each 
other, covered with straw, and set on fi re. The women 
and children imprisoned in the church heard the 
shootings and the crying of their relatives before the 
Germans returned to throw explosives in the building, 
after which the door was opened and the escaping 
people were one by one killed by gun fi re. Then 
the Germans started a fi esta in the burning village, 
plundering the wine cellars and drinking until late that 
night surrounded by burning houses and the smell of 
burned bodies. Two days later the Germans returned 
to wipe out all of the traces by cutting up the corpses 
and burying them in diff erent mass graves, making 
identifi cation almost impossible (Hawes 2007). 
Oradour is just one of many villages in Western Europe 
where Nazi units during WWII were killing people in 
a ‘war against civilians’. In the Netherlands in October 
1944 660 men of the village of Putten were transported 
to German concentration camps of which only 10 per 
cent survived the war (De Keizer 1998), and in Italy 
Nazi troops killed in March 24th 1944 335 civilians in 
the Ardeanate caves in Rome (Portelli 2003), while 
in Tuscany on August 12th 1944 about 300 SS troops 
massacred and burned down the village of Sant’Anna 
di Stazzama. According to Paolo Pezzino, this was 
part of an organized campaign under Field Marshal 
Kesselring’s Headquarters from 1943 to 1945 by which 
3,650 people were killed in more than 200 operations, 
of which only a fi fth was organized as a response to 
partisan attacks (Pezzino 2012, 6). What these massacres 
have in common is a cruelty against civilians unknown 
in Nazi occupied Western Europe up to then.
1. Holocaust paradigm
From the Second World War onwards European 
political integration is based on the assumption of 
a mutual cultural heritage and common cultural 
values. Yet we may ask, does such a consensus really 
exist? Notwithstanding Europe’s common roots, 
based on Christianity and the on-going project of the 
Enlightenment, most European nations share mainly a 
traumatic history of war and confl ict. Nonetheless, the 
devastating horrors of two World Wars have for the last 
six decades stimulated a unique process of European 
unifi cation. Millions of fallen soldiers, the mass 
slaughter of European civilians, and the destruction of 
the Jews have determined, almost dialectically, so to 
speak, Europe’s post-war humanist politics of memory 
and identity as the total negation of the Nazi and 
Bolshevik ‘age of the camps’ (Bauman 2001).
If the European project seemed fi nished and history 
ended with the Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the shock 
of the Yugoslav War and the Srebrenica Massacre 
of 1995 opened peoples eyes for the possibility that 
history repeats itself. Only since then the recognition 
of the Holocaust and all other genocides – and, as 
a consequence, the prosecution of racism, ethnic 
cleansing, and Holocaust denial – function as a ticket to 
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European and western citizenship. A citizenship based 
on the undisputed recognition of a common painful 
past.  
In the Stockholm Declaration of the International Forum 
on the Holocaust of January 2000, 44 world-leaders 
declared the Shoah to be the main challenge of Western 
civilization, of which the cruelty and magnitude should 
be ‘forever seared in our collective memory’, while new 
genocides should be prevented by research, education 
and remembrance to ‘plant the seeds of a better future 
amidst the soil of a bitter past (as quoted from the 
ITF website). In 2005 the General Assembly of the UN 
supported the Task Force for International Cooperation 
on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research 
(ITF) in its mission by declaring the founding of a yearly 
Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27th, the day 
of the (Russian!) liberation of Auschwitz.
Yet did we really live in the shadow of Auschwitz? 
Auschwitz during the Cold War was still regarded a 
communist remembrance place, and so were most 
other ‘civic’ terrorscapes. Thus in France the citizens of 
the rebuilt town of Oradour, next to the consecrated 
ruins of the ‘martyred village’, were voting for a 
communist mayor who declared his municipality 
independent from French offi  cials, after the pardoning 
of Vichy war criminals and French SS-soldiers at the 
Bordeaux trial of 1953. The municipal council scrapped 
the plans for putting the ashes of their ‘martyrs’ in a 
state’s monument and built its own, still existing local 
monument, posted at that time with large placards 
listing the nationalist members of parliament who had 
voted for the amnesty of some perpetrators of the 
Oradour massacre (Farmer 1999, 178–80). 
A few years later the Netherlands’ government forbade 
the placement of an urn with earth from Auschwitz to 
be put next to the symbolic ashes of fallen members 
of the national (non-communist) resistance movement, 
military soldiers, and bombing victims in the so-called 
urn wall of the National War Memorial (1956), opposite 
the Royal Palace at the Amsterdam Dam square. The 
urn was only much later placed in the Auschwitz 
Memorial at the Amsterdam Wertheim Park (1993). A 
decade later, in 1965, the burgomaster of Putten as well 
as the liberal press and the Dutch government accused 
the Czech village of Lidice of communist propaganda 
when planting roses for Putten in a local remembrance 
garden, trying to relate the fate of the Dutch martyred 
village to their own communist ‘antifascist struggle’ 
against the West (De Keizer 1998, 307–8).
Although many of these heroic cold war narratives now 
seem bizarre to us, I will argue that also the post-1989 
assumption of the Holocaust as a common European 
experience, and hence as a crucial paradigm of 
Europe’s postwar identity politics, raises some critical 
objections:
In the fi rst place the iconic role of Auschwitz as the 
world’s unique, transcending genocide is challenged 
by historians, arguing that the Holocaust should be put 
in the context of both world wars and explained by the 
ideological, military and geopolitical competition and 
confrontation of Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism.
Secondly, a series of recent memory confl icts show a 
deep incompatibility of opinions among politicians and 
citizens about the impact, interpretation and meaning 
of Nazi, communist and nationalist terror, genocide and 
dictatorship in Europe’s ‘Age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm 
1994). This concerns the traumatic politics of forgetting 
and ‘remembering’ with regard to Hitler’s Germany, 
Franco’s Spain, Mussolini’s Italy and Vichy France as well 
as the even more complicated wartime and postwar 
occupation histories of the Balkans, Ukraine, Poland, 
and the Baltics.
Thus, although in many Eastern European countries 
today Soviet politics are held exclusively responsible 
for their postwar economic underdevelopment, this 
revisionism underestimates the consequences of the 
short, but devastating war period and Nazi occupation. 
As recently argued with help of statistical sources, 
occupation means something completely diff erent 
in diff erent parts of Europe. While western and 
north-western occupied economies were generally 
stimulated by German orders, eastern and south-
eastern Europe faced a Nazi policy of mass killing, 
plundering and unscrupulous exploitation. Western 
countries could therefore in the fi rst postwar period by 
American aid easily recover from the vicious circle of 
monetary chaos and food and fuel shortage, while ‘the 
war severely and permanently damaged the economic 
power of the Soviets’ (Klemann & Kudryashov 2012, 429). 
In view of this unequal development not only the start 
of the Cold War should be reinterpreted but also the 
Fall of the Wall and the future of the European Union. In 
other words, diff erent war heritages might have a long 
lasting impact on the transnational memory culture of 
old’ and ‘new’ Europe.
2. Anne Frank experience
Now let me fi rst turn to the origin of the western 
Holocaust narrative. The Anne Frank House in 
Amsterdam is today, next to Auschwitz, by far the 
most successful Holocaust museum in Europe. At the 
time of its founding by Otto Frank in the 1960s in his 
former storehouse at the Prinsengracht, a canal in the 
centre of Amsterdam, no-one would have expected 
this unsightly place to become one of the Netherlands 
most visited tourist spots with more than one million 
yearly visitors – to compare, Auschwitz attracts at about 
1,5 million visitors (Van der Lans & Vuijsje 2010), and the 
number is still growing.
Why do so many people more than 65 years after the 
war want to visit the Dutch hiding place of a German-
Jewish refugee family? As Pierre Nora and others 
have suggested this remarkable need for a spatial 
experiencing of the past represents a postmodern 
transformation of history into memory (Nora 1996; 
Lowenthal 1996, 2005). Mediated memories and tourist 
gazing have therefore become crucial for performing 
the past as ‘our’ heritage, and heritage sites have 
become more popular than history books. This 
packaging of the past by a consumption of places fulfi ls 
a growing need for (place or staged) authenticity (Urry 
2002; Ashworth 2005; MacCannell 2011). This might 
explain also the popularity of Holocaust memorials 
and museums, as they off er visitors a virtual ‘Holocaust 
experience’, a nearness of the past which history can 
never off er. Yet, the Holocaust, just like the Great War 
before, has at the same time become itself a crucial 
symbol of this traumatic break with the past (Winter 
2006). Cut off  from our postwar experiences and 
memories by the traumatic atrocities of war, terror 
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and genocide, the Holocaust memory boom may 
even have contributed more than anything else to the 
alienated sense of the past as a world we’ve lost – to 
be experienced only by literature, fi lm and sightseeing. 
For heritage needs identifi cation.
Thus Otto’s daughter Anne Frank is the central fi gure 
in the Amsterdam museum’s plot, based on her own 
world-famous script, the diary. And the museum’s text 
is the hiding of the Franks and a befriended Jewish 
family in the so-called Secret Annex (the back of the 
house) during the persecution of the Jews from 1942 
to 1944. In the making of Anne Frank as the paradigm 
victim of the Holocaust her personal story has been 
framed by her father and others as a universal narrative 
of human persecution and genocide (Lee 2002; Prose 
2009). For, as we know, Anne Frank’s diary, published in 
Dutch in 1947 as Het Achterhuis and translated in English 
as The Diary of a Young Girl in 1952 was the fi rst of a long 
series of Jewish war memories mediatized in fi ction 
and fi lm, starting with the prize-winning American 
Broadway play The Diary of Anne Frank (1955), (revived 
in 1997 with Natalie Portman in the role of Anne), and 
George Steven’s award-winning fi lm version of 1959, up 
to mega Hollywood productions of other family stories, 
such as the television mini-series Holocaust (1978), 
Sophie’s Choice (1982), and Schindler’s List (1993). 
In particular for Jews in Israel and the United States 
(more than in the Netherlands itself), as well as for 
many tourists in search for ‘virtual Jewishness’, as Ruth 
Ellen Gruber put it, the Anne Frank House has become 
a universal lieux de mémoire in one of Europe’s most 
important ‘cities without Jews’ (Gruber 2002). For if 
the ‘selling’ of Anne Frank was fundamental to the 
‘Americanization of the Holocaust’ (Flanzbaum 1999; 
Cole 2000), place authenticity is still for ‘fans’ the unique 
selling point of the Anne Frank Museum. Yet nowadays 
the ‘Anne Frank experience’ can be consumed by 
prosthetic memory almost everywhere (Landsberg 
2004). Thus the recently opened Centro Ana Frank in 
Rio de Janeiro off ers a virtual experience by way of a 
replica of the famous bookcase – the secret door to the 
annex – and even a shoot from the now gone Anne 
Frank-tree in the garden behind the Amsterdam canal 
house. What we experience in the empty rooms with no 
more than some original wallpaper spotted with movie 
star pictures in Anne’s original room in Amsterdam or 
in the staged ‘room of Ana’ in Rio de Janeiro, is a crucial 
aspect of the Holocaust memory boom, the experience 
of a heritage of loss (Van der Laarse 2011).
3. Landscapes without Jews
Remarkably, Anne’s diary does not have anything to say 
about the camps. Nonetheless the notion of absence 
that probably originated from Hugo Bettauer’s 
foretelling and fi lmed novel Die Stadt ohne Juden 
(1924), also colours our experiencing of Holocaust sites 
in eastern Europe; the vast ‘landscapes without Jews’ 
where the terror really happened. Thus one of the most 
infl uential Holocaust novels of the last decade, praised 
by critics as the fi rst ‘true story’, Daniel Mendelsohn’s The 
Lost (2006), is written by a Jewish American, a classicist 
at Princeton University with an eye for Odyssean plots, 
searching for stories of six lost relatives in the Ukrainian 
village of Bolechov in former Galicia. Mendelsohn’s 
obsession with his family’s past started in the eighties, 
spurred by the fi nding of some old letters in the pocket 
of his deceased maternal grandfather Abraham Jaeger, 
which were written in 1939 by some relatives asking for 
help to fl ee to America after the German invasion.
As a descent of a Jewish family migrated to the US 
before the Second World War, Daniel Mendelsohn 
had to cope like many migrants with a break in his life 
history, and like many Jewish Americans and Israelis’ 
after 1989 he searched as a ‘root tourist’ in Eastern 
Europe for a Jewish heritage and identity. For Bolechov 
only, I counted at least ten Jewish genealogist websites, 
among them his brother Andrew’s The Mendelsohn 
Family Bolochow Website. For these second or third 
generation American Jews their family history had 
literally become a foreign country. Before the Fall of 
the Wall the Ukraine was never visited by Americans, 
and The Lost can be read as an attempt to recall lost 
stories into Holocaust memory. But the book is also an 
account of a disillusion. Hoping to fi nd witnesses of his 
family’s past, Daniel Mendelsohn only became aware 
of the complete fatality of the events. Asking some 
school children playing in a schoolyard, they answered 
that they had never heard of any Jew in Bolechov. We 
arrived at a ‘death place’, as he told in an interview, ‘a 
place where nothing could be found, and certainly 
not the people we searched for’. Thus searching for his 
roots, Mendelsohn found in the Eastern landscapes of 
the death just a heritage of loss. Or, as he put it: ‘The 
stories don’t fi t into reality’ (Zeeman 2007).
In my view, Mendelsohn’s quest belongs to the same 
semantic space as the Anne Frank House, Yad Vashem, 
the USHMM, or the Mémorial de la Shoah in Paris, and 
the Polish State Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau. The social 
exclusion and hiding of Jews that would end in the 
Jewish destruction camps, Anne Frank and Auschwitz, 
are thematised in Jerusalem and Washington as icons 
of present-day Holocaust discourse, with Auschwitz 
as the paradigmatic genocide and Anne Frank as the 
paradigmatic victim. In the same way the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising of January–May 1943, fi ctionalized in 
novels and fi lms, and staged for display in the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum as well as in other 
Holocaust museums, such as the Israeli Yad Mordechai 
kibbutz museum, represents a paradigmatic Jewish 
martyrdom. For in Holocaust narrative this bloody 
crushed rebellion is framed as the beginning of the 
Jewish Resurgence that would have led to the rebirth 
of the Zionist Muscle Jew and the founding of the 
State of Israel (Mosse 1993; Van der Laarse 1999; Sand 
2009). Interestingly, this Jewish resistance myth with its 
appeal to the nationalist utopia of the New Man, show 
a remarkable similarity with the less known Polish 
partisan myth of the Warsaw Rebellion of August 1st 
1944, ending up in the Nazi destruction of the city, as 
being fi ctionalized by communists and Catholics, and 
staged for display recently in the new Warsaw Rising 
Museum (Jasinski & Usielski 2007).
4. Unearthing the Past
Transforming personal experiences into literature 
Holocaust narratives – from Anne Frank and Elie 
Wiesel to Daniel Mendelsohn – may give a voice to 
the lost as well as to the Auschwitz survivors. But not 
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all survivors participate in this master narrative. In 2002 
the French priest Patrick Desbois, head of the French 
episcopal offi  ce for Jewish relations, went just like 
Daniel Mendelsohn to the Ukraine in the footsteps of 
his grandfather. He had been imprisoned during the 
Second World War as a French soldier in a Nazi camp 
in the town of Rava-Ruska, and according to him his 
suff ering was nothing compared to that of the Jews. 
Curious about the fate of 1,5 million Jews executed in 
the Ukraine, Desbois started to ask the same questions 
as Mendelsohn, again without getting answers. In his 
case, however, what started as a sort of exploratory 
tourism ended up in an archaeological expedition 
when Desbois went back three years later.
The reason for this remarkable choice was a television 
documentary he saw in Paris about the Bosnian mass 
graves. A forensic expert, a woman, told the reporter 
about the diffi  culties of identifying the corpses at 
Srebrenica because – exactly as the Germans in Oradour 
– the Serbs deliberately dug them up after the shooting 
to quarter them and rebury the parts in diff erent places; 
a method already used by the Habsburgs against the 
Bohemians at the Battle of the White Mountains in 
1619 (Wheatcroft 1996, 179). Yet the modern researcher 
was able to reconstruct the killings by way of a metal 
detector, because as she observed: where cartridge 
cases are, are corpses. Back in the Ukraine, Desbois 
was led by the obsession to dig deeper, as he writes in 
Porteur de mémoires (2007), translated as The Holocaust 
by bullets (2009).
A young ballistic expert from Lvov, named Mischa 
became the man with the metal detector. What made 
the diff erence was the fi nding of hundreds of cartridge 
cases, not in a secret place but nearby the village. As 
Desbois noticed: ‘One bullet, a Jew; a Jew, a bullet’, 
because the Germans never used more than one 
bullet to kill a Jew (Desbois 2009, 54). From then on, 
people started to talk, and the silence was broken. The 
stories came back, not only in Rava-Ruska but all over 
the Ukraine. Day after day Desbois’ team interviewed 
hundreds of witnesses, some in their nineties – and 
it still goes on, counting by now already tens of 
expeditions. Old people brought Desbois’ team to pits 
where Jews were slaughtered. These places were not 
forgotten, nor hidden. Thus sometimes people went on 
to throw cadavers of cows and horses upon the corpses 
after the War, and a local forest was known as Lis na 
Jevrejach (Wood on the Jews). As Desbois found out 
the bullets were not only a clue to locate the victims, 
but also a means to recover memories – precisely as 
happened during this same period in other parts of the 
former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and in Franco’s 
Spain, where archaeological excavations of mass 
graves related to Stalinist and nationalist terror during 
the age of the camps started an ‘unearthing of the past’ 
(Paperno 2002; Jerez-Farrán & Amago 2010). In Ukraine 
during the Nazi occupation often complete families 
were loaded on trucks, and shot at the pits by German 
commandos. This murdering did have neither heroes 
nor bystanders as the villagers were often forced to 
support the massacres by guarding Jews, removing 
golden teeth, or stamping the earth of the mass graves. 
Yet their muteness, the wall of silence, was not caused 
by a deep seated anti-Semitism, as often thought by 
Western critics of Polish and Ukrainian massacres during 
the Nazi occupation. Instead, the bullet-Holocaust 
seemed to have been extremely traumatic for most of 
these non-Jewish witnesses because the Jews were no 
strangers, such as those in Auschwitz, but natives, often 
friends or neighbours, and children from the village 
school. People knew the victims by name, and some 
still heard their screaming and begging for help, or 
the repeating sound of the German submachine guns 
and Mauser carbines: A Mauser could contain only fi ve 
bullets, which explains why trucks were loaded with 
at about 50 people and families in the pit were shot in 
groups of fi ve (Desbois 2009, 56). 
This ‘holocaust by bullet’ had nothing to do with the 
industrial murders of Auschwitz or other Nazi camps. 
Here were no guards who would later claim to have 
never personally murdered. Neither had the stories of 
these witnesses anything to do with those of Auschwitz 
survivors, as fi lmed by Claude Lanzmann in Shoah and 
taped by the Steven Spielberg Project in almost all 
European countries, except Ukraine and Belorussia 
where most of the mass murders took place (though 
without western victims). Hence, my theme is the clash 
of Holocaust narratives, more precisely the mismatch 
of the Holocaust master narrative with the war and 
postwar experiences of the survivors of hundreds 
of Eastern European terrorscapes, faded away in the 
shadow of Auschwitz.
5. Politics of Genocide: fact and fi ction
If Auschwitz has become our common heritage, it is 
because it was the place where ‘our’ Jews from West-
European cities went to, and from which we know so 
much because of its many survivors. But what do we 
know about the experiences of the eastern European 
Jewish and non-Jewish populations? Many of them 
were already dead before the building of Birkenau in 
1942, and almost none of the survivors were able to 
publish war memories.
As far as the camps played a role in the killing of Polish 
and Baltic Jews we should look at the early extermination 
camps of Operation Reinhardt – Treblinka, Belzac 
and Sobibor – of which almost no-one survived. Thus 
from the Netherlands  Selma Engel-Wijnberg was the 
only Dutch-Jewish survivor of Sobibor, who escaped 
during the Uprising of October 14, 1943 together with 
her future Polish husband, though even her story 
would never been told as she was not allowed to 
return to her homeland with her foreign husband and 
migrated to the United States (Trouw 2010). Besides, 
most of the Jews were killed outside the iconic camps 
during the Shoah by bullet, in Poland and Ukraine as 
well as Lithuania, Belorussia and Rumania. Of the 1.5 
million Jews killed in these three camps, Treblinka 
counted almost half of them and Belzac almost half 
a million. At the end of 1941 already one million Jews 
were murdered in camps and one million in villages, 
and buried in pits. Thus by September 1942, with the 
exception of Czechs and Hungarians, the Eastern Jewry 
was exterminated or fl ed to Russia (a neglected fact in 
Holocaust historiography).
Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands (2010) has recently put the 
‘ignored reality’ of the Holocaust high on the historical 
and political agenda (Snyder 2009 and 2010).
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What are the facts?
The Holocaust by bullet made more victims than 
Auschwitz during the war.
The heart of the Holocaust was in Eastern Europe: 
70 percent of the 5.7 million Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust were Poles (three million) and Russians (one 
million). Next to them came Rumanians, Hungarians, 
and Czechs, and behind them the Jews from Western 
Europe. 
Prior to the Holocaust, the Nazi killings started with 
Russian prisoners of war, numbering 3.3. million, of 
which two million were already shot in the fi rst nine 
months of the Eastern War in 1941, even before the 
organized persecution of the Jews. Apart from the 5.8 
million Jewish victims of the Holocaust this ‘Forgotten 
Genocide’ was by far the greatest war crime in history, 
though completely neglected in western literature and 
public opinion (Berkhoff  2005; Porter 2010).
These groups of data show the original Eastern 
European character of the Holocaust, a project of 
destruction developed during the Nazi war against 
Bolshevism. Yet the Holocaust was not unique. The 
Russians too were mass killers. Prior to the ten million 
civilians killed by Germans, the Bolsheviks killed, or 
were responsible for the death of another fi ve million, 
although, to paraphrase Snyder, as a general rule 
the Nazis killed non-German citizens, whereas the 
Bolsheviks killed Soviet citizens.
In the Belarusian and Ukrainian killing fi elds, the center 
of the Holocaust by bullet, Kulaks had already been 
victimized by Stalin’s policy of forced collectivization 
to fi nance industrialization (1929), which resulted in the 
‘terror-famines’ of 1932–3 among whom the Kazakh 
Famine (one million deaths) and the Ukraine Famine 
(three million deaths), followed by the Great Terror of 
1937–8 with another 600.000 victims shot by KNVD 
bullets, as reconstructed for Ukraine even before 
the opening of the Soviet archives. Though strongly 
criticized for its use of sources and far too high numbers, 
Robert Conquest’s pioneering Harvest of Sorrow (1986) 
has become after the Orange Revolution of 2006 the 
academic legitimation of the ‘Holodomor’ – the offi  cial 
term for what politicians also named the ‘Ukrainian 
genocide’ or ‘Ukrainian Holocaust’. The Ukrainian 
parliament has declared its offi  cial remembering at the 
fourth Saturday in November, whereas President Viktor 
Yushchenko even suggested making the denial of the 
Terror Famine punishable by law.
Remarkably, the Ukrainian government did not seem to 
have noticed that the impact of the Nazi Hunger Plan of 
the winter of 1941–2 by far exceeded that of Soviet forced 
collectivization. This second terror famine deliberately 
caused the starvation of another another 3-4 million 
people after the German conquest of Belorussia and 
Ukraine that became the Third Reich’s largest colony 
(Berkhoff  2004, Snyder 2010, 411). The Hungerplan was 
a prelude to Heinrich Himmler’s Generalplan Ost, the 
planned Germanization of conquered Poland and 
Western Russia, implemented after the German invasion 
of Russia in 1941 by the SS-policy of Ostkolonisation. 
Under the slogan ‘Heim ins Reich’ this resulted in the 
annexed West Poland, renamed as Warthegau, in the 
forced deportation of at least 100,000 Poles and the 
complete extermination of the Jews, to be replaced by 
Baltic Volksdeutschen (Rössler & Schleiermacher 1993; 
Heineman 2003; Van der Laarse 2009).
Thus Auschwitz was not the Holocaust, not the 
beginning, nor the end of ethnic cleansing in Eastern 
Europe. The Nazi planned destruction of the Jews was 
part of a greater project to destroy all Bolsheviks and 
Slavic populations, which only in the case of the Jews 
has been completely implemented. So, for instance, 
the Germans succeeded in killing at least 750,000 
people in the fi ght against partisans (of which at least 
350,000 in Belarus), and 100,000 Poles at the crush of the 
Warsaw Uprising of 1944, not to be confused with the 
Jewish Ghetto Uprising a year before. Of the ten million 
civilians killed in Eastern Europe by German mass 
slaughter, however, half of them were Jews. Belarus, 
Poland and the Ukraine were the center of the German 
killings, and the deadliest place in the world. Here 
between 1941–4 at least 20 per cent of the population 
(almost 15 million people) died of warfare, terror and 
hunger, whereas – insofar statistics may have any use 
for this catastrophic period – approximately another 20 
per cent were forced to fl ee their countries (Klemann & 
Kudryashov 2012, 414–5).
It might be clear that from an Eastern European 
perspective the suff ering in Western Europe was 
almost negligible. Thus in the Netherlands about 
200,000 people were killed by fi ghting, bombings and 
persecution, among whom 102,000 were Jews, which is 
2.3 per cent of the population. Nazi Germany suff ered 
most of the Western countries with 7.5 million deaths 
(10.8 per cent of the population), among them some 
165,000 Jews and 70,000 euthanasia patients killed 
by the Nazi’s, and 5.3 million military victims of which 
460,000 soldiers died of starvation in Allied war prisoner 
camps (Overmans 2000), among them 360,000 in 
Russian POW camps, which is just a tenth though of the 
number of Russian soldiers who died in German POW 
camps. Roughly 370,000–600,000 of 1.8 million German 
civilian deaths were killed by Allied bombings of cities 
(Friedrich 2004), and at about ten per cent (600,000) of 
a total number of six million German war refugees died 
on the run for Stalin’s Red Army in 1944–5. Yet only few 
felt victim to the more organized post-war expulsion 
of another six million German Heimatvertriebenen 
felt victim to the expulsion of Germans from Poland 
and the Czech Republic. Besides, Mass migration was 
not a German monopoly during this period of shifting 
German-Polish and Polish-Ukrainian (now Russian) 
borders. Next to the Jews and the Germans of Polonized 
Prussia and the Baltics, eastern Poland was ethnically 
cleansed from Ukrainians and western Ukraine from 
Poles, after which only ruins and graveyards remind 
postwar inhabitants and root tourists of centuries of 
multiculturalism (Snyder 2003; Lowe 2012).
I hope this will put the recent debate on German 
victimhood in a broader perspective (Neven 2006), 
and question also the legalistic way of dealing with 
genocide, such as in the case of the Demjanjuk trial, 
which seems to me completely irrelevant in the light 
of the Western neglect of the millions of Ukrainian 
victims during the Hitler-Stalin War. It should also 
warn us for too much praise of Lord Claus Schenk 
von Stauff enberg and other Wehrmacht heroes for 
their failed assassination attack on Hitler in July 1944, 
for these were the offi  cers responsible for Himmler’s 
Ostkolonisation. As shown in Wibke Bruhns’ Meines 
Vaters Land (2004), a stout-hearted quest to the 
wartime role of her father Hans Georg Klamroth, a 
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liberal entrepreneur from Halberstadt who became a 
member of Hitler’s Nazi party and Himmler’s SS, and 
served as a Wehrmacht offi  cer at the Eastern Front.  To 
his daughters astonishment he had returned two years 
before at his own request to the Russian killing fi elds 
where he cherished good memories of earlier fi ghts in 
the First World War. Although plotting against Hitler in 
the July Bomb Plot, Klamroth never questioned in his 
letters and diary the Germanizing of Poland, the killing 
of the political elite, and the destruction of the Jews.
6. Contested memories 
Aleksander Smolars, the Polish-French sociologist, 
has rightly called for attaching more importance to 
Eastern European memories in a post 1989 politics of 
European memory. Yet Holocaust and post-communist 
memory cultures have not much in common. If the 
Holocaust has become the cornerstone of Western war 
remembrance and democracy (next to the postcolonial 
inheritance of slavery and racism), than Central-Eastern 
Europeans may ask for a new memorial agenda of their 
own. Feed by the ‘betrayal myths’ of the Western role 
at Munich (1938) and Yalta (1945), and the Russian role 
at the Molotow-Ribbentrop Pakt (1939) and the Warsaw 
Uprising (1944), this will reconsider the traumatic 
impact of both Nazi and Communist terror. Personally 
I don’t think it is wise to create another series of 
international remembrance days – but for a European 
politics of memory to become successful we should 
recognize at least at Holocaust Memorial Day, the day 
of the liberation of Auschwitz, the shortcomings of the 
Stockholm narrative.
In the fi rst place we should not forget that the national-
militarist appropriation of the commemoration of the 
Allied forces and armed resistance has suppressed 
in most European countries up to the 1980s the 
memory of the Holocaust. Although the Second 
World War has become in Western countries almost 
completely associated with the Holocaust, for decades 
the persecution of the Jews did not play a crucial 
role in war remembrances. In the West as in the East 
commemorating took place along national and often 
nationalist lines. In most Western European countries, 
such as the Netherlands, Dachau, Buchenwald, and 
Auschwitz were mainly commemorated by former 
political prisoners and other camp survivors, and only 
from the 1970s Auschwitz and other camps gradually 
developed into signifi cant Holocaust icons.
Secondly, although Europe’s memory culture might 
nowadays be put under the shadow of Auschwitz, 
the Polish State Museum and Memorial Auschwitz-
Birkenau was established in 1947 to commemorate 
‘the martyrdom of the Polish nation and other nations 
in Oswiecim’, and was still nominated as such for the 
UNESCO world heritage list in 1978. One year later 
though, the Polish pope John Paul II on his visit to Poland 
transformed this Polish ‘Auschwitz without Jews’ with 
theological support of his future German successor 
cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, into a Catholic martyrium 
and a national site of resistance against communism 
(Dwork & Van Pelt 1996, 367–71). Thereafter Auschwitz-
Birkenau witnessed contesting appropriations of 
UNESCO experts, Polish catholic nationalists, the 
State of Israel and American-Jewish organizations, the 
German Federal Republic and the European Union 
(Zubrzycki 2006). While on the one hand the original 
State museum Auschwitz I still represents the same 
sort of patriotism as today’s Warsaw Rising Museum, 
on the other Birkenau or Auschwitz II has become the 
main touristic spot for an in situ ‘Holocaust experience’. 
Polish visitors of the prison cell of Father Maximilian 
Kolbe, ‘the martyred saint of Auschwitz’, are competing 
with Israeli and American-Jewish root tourists as well 
as Western European citizens searching for virtual 
Jewishness in Birkenau and Krakau’s Kazimierz district. 
Holocaust sites might therefore become more and 
more contested spaces, characterized by both a 
globalization and localization of memory.
Thirdly, one could argue that the recent discussion on 
the ‘Holocaust by bullet’ – the mass killing of Jews at 
the Polish and Ukrainian killing fi elds – undermines the 
paradigmatic role of Auschwitz (or the camps), as most 
European Jews, living in Eastern Europe, were already 
killed before the building of Birkenau. We might 
therefore expect that long neglected terrorscapes 
would attract more academic and public attention, 
such as the Kiev site of the Babi Yar massacre of 29–30 
September 1941 (34,000 Jewish deaths), the Vilnius 
site of the Ponary or Paneriai massacres (estimated 
70,000 Jews and 20,000 Poles killed between July 1941 
and August 1941), and the Massacres in Transnistria, 
numbering alone in Odessa at 22 October some 
25,000 Jewish deaths), executed by German, Ukrainian, 
Lithuanian and Romanian troops.
And fi nally, as an unexpected result of the Fall of the 
Wall (1989) the Western Holocaust memory boom 
might become challenged by a deep incompatibility of 
opinions about the impact, interpretation and meaning 
of the World Wars between present-day Western and 
Eastern European populations. As symbols of the Age 
of the camps both Auschwitz and the Gulag Archipel 
have made us blind for the hundreds of normal citizens 
acting as mass murderers or killed by mass slaughter 
at local terrorscapes were people had to cope with the 
less spectacular, but much more eff ective NKVD and 
Nazi murdering by bullet, and the total absence of their 
stories in Western Europe.
7. Memory wars and Occupation paradigm
Although the Age of the Extremes, terrorized by 
Nazism, communism and civil war, seem to have 
fi nally ended in 1989, the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 
functioned as a wake-up call, fading away the naïve, 
liberal illusion of an end of history. The unusual call for 
military intervention, framed in Western Europe and 
the United States from the perspective of the atrocities 
of the Jewish extermination camps, was illustrative for 
Auschwitz’s new symbolic role as the paradigmatic 
genocide.
Yet, as it seems to me, the project of European 
expansion creates new and fundamental tensions 
in memory politics. Because of the post-Cold War 
expansion of the EU from 12 to 27 member states, we 
may even expect in the near future a paradigm shift 
in Europe’s memory culture. For, starting with Eastern 
Germany (after the 1990 German reunifi cation) and the 
former neutral nations Austria, Sweden and Finland 
in 1995, the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 resulted 
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in twelve new member states of Central Eastern 
Europe as well as in Ukraine and Belarus sandwiched 
as New Eastern Europe between the European Union 
and Russia, the Holocaust seem to be held by neo-
nationalist politicians as a Western construct that 
completely ignores the long-lasting impact on their 
societies of Bolshevism from 1918 up to 1989. Hence, 
for many (non-Jewish) people in Eastern Europe today 
not the German SS or Wehrmacht but the Red Army 
functions as the main symbol of oppression. 
Thus the European continent is not only strewn with 
lots of newly discovered terrorscapes, but New Europe’s 
former communist states seem unwilling to handle 
their traumatic war and postwar experiences in terms 
of the Western Holocaust master narrative. Therefore I 
see at the moment at least three possible scenarios for 
Europe’s theater of memory:
The fi rst scenario opens the perspective of a growing 
number of memory and heritage wars. So, for instance, 
the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn, the communist national 
liberty monument of 1945 has been relocated in 2007, 
together with the remains of some Red Army soldiers 
to a Russian war cemetery, because most Estonians 
regarded the Soviets as occupiers instead of liberators. 
The old monument of a Red Army partisan honored 
during the Soviet period, now functions only as a 
proud symbol of the ethnic Russian minority, whereas 
Estonian nationalists remember ‘their’ fallen soldiers 
at the Monument of Lihula (2002); a bronze bas-relief 
of a fascist ‘freedom-fi ghter’ with a German Stahlhelm, 
representing the SS Unions fi ghting alongside the 
German Wehrmacht and Waff en SS in the anti-Partisan 
war against the ‘Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy’. As a 
tribute to these anti-communist martyrs in the ‘War for 
Estonian independence’ the Lihula monument raised 
a lot of protest by Western Jewish organizations such 
as the Simon Wiesenthal Center. The removal of the 
monument by EU and US pressure, caused however a 
storm of protest among Estonians, after which it has 
been relocated in 2005 at the privately owned Museum 
of the Fight for Estonian Freedom at Lagedi nearby 
Talinn (Melchior & Visser 2011). 
In the context of the long-lasting Russifi cation of the 
Baltics these memory wars will also have personal 
consequences, which might be seen as a second 
scenario. Thus the Ukrainian partisan Stepan Bandera, 
killed by the KGB in 1959, has been posthumously 
proclaimed a ‘national hero’ by president Yushchenko 
in 2010 whereas he is treated as a war criminal in Poland 
for his role in the ethnic cleansing during the German 
occupation. Cleverly using human right narratives 
and the Western war on terror, nationalists are also 
trying to change the markers of terror and genocide 
by demanding the persecution of communist 
perpetrators, such as in the case of the Lithuanian ‘war 
crimes investigation’ against one of the last surviving 
Jewish communist partisans Dr Rachel Margolis and 
Fania Brantsovsky, both escaped from the Vilnius 
ghetto where they lost their entire families. Although 
a public hero for many years Brantsovsky has now 
been accused of murdering 38 ‘innocent’ Lithuanian 
villagers in January 1944; a ‘massacre’ though, 
according to Yad Vashem, the Simon Wiesenthal 
Center, the British House of Lords and Prime Minister, 
and US congressmen applying to Lithuanian leaders in 
2009, which happened to be an ordered punishment 
expedition against nationalists collaborating with the 
Germans in the killing of 3500 Jews in a bordering 
village (Hendriks 2009). 
Yet more serious than these bizarre accusations is the 
EU attitude or more precisely that of the European 
Court of Human Rights on historical war crimes. Thus 
the Russian former partisan Vitali Kononov, accused 
in Letland for murdering nine villagers in 1944, who 
helped the Nazis catching partisans, was sentenced 
by a Latvian Court in 2004. Not unlikely under Russian 
pressure – Moskow opposed the verdict as an hostile 
attempt to undermine the ‘good war’ against Nazism – 
the Latvian Court of Appeal declared the lawsuit illegal; 
a decision, though, dismissed by the Strasbourg Court 
in 2010! In terms of jurisdiction this incredible, legalist 
verdict, representing as it seems Europe’s geopolitical 
power shift, may cause enormous problems in the EU’s 
dealing with the past and its external relations, whereas 
its historical amnesia seriously undermines the Court’s 
authority by legitimating the ‘human right strategy’ 
adopted by streetwise Holocaust negationists, trying 
to rewrite history.
A last scenario concerns the dissemination of the 
revisionist ‘double genocide’ paradigm by the use of 
new memorial museums (Otto 2010). This occupation 
paradigm is supported by the 2008 Prague Declaration 
that, as an alternative to the Holocaust’s paradigm’s 
Stockholm Declaration, demands from the EU to 
‘recognize Communism and Nazism as a common 
legacy’ and deal with communist crimes in the same 
way as the Nuremberg Tribunal did with Nazi crimes. An 
EU parliament resolution of April 2 2009 recommends 
in the spirit of the ‘red-brown’ myth of the Eastern 
European suff ering as victims of two regimes of 
terror, the ‘Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the 
victims of all totalitarian regimes’ (Katz 2012). Thus, 
after the post-communist relocation of monuments 
and the renaming of streets the Riga Museum of 
Occupations 1939–91 replaces the memory war with a 
museological script of three occupations: the Russian 
annexation of 1939, the 1941 German incorporation as 
Reichskommisariat Ostland (welcomed by nationalists 
at the time as a liberation!), and the postwar Russian 
‘occupation’ that lasted until Latvia’s independence 
of 1991. The Occupation museum pays attention to 
long ‘forgotten’ NKVD genocides, such as the mass 
graves of Latvian freedom fi ghters already used in 
Nazi propaganda, although the highly contested 
elimination of the Riga and Liepaja ghettos in 1943 and 
the murdering of the Jews from Vilnius and Hungary 
in Riga’s Kaiserwald concentration camp in 1944 is 
also mentioned. The Riga museum may work as a 
laboratory for new critical questions, but behind the 
ongoing debate on numbers and ethnicity ideological 
wars are still fought out with Russia as well as Europe 
(Nollendorf 2008; Rislakki 2008).
That this relatively balanced position is not self-
evident, though, is shown by the one-sided display of 
Vilnius’ Genocide Museum, located in a former KGB 
headquarter and devoted mainly to the murdering of 
70,000 citizens under Soviet occupation without paying 
much attention to the Lithuanian Holocaust, except for 
a small room recently added in reaction to Western 
critique. The same applies to the Budapest Terror 
House museum (2002), which tells more about the 
Hungarian Holocaust of 1944, but likewise silences their 
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own participation in Nazi terror. Nonetheless, although 
these new museums show a tendency to operate as 
an intermediary between nationalist, anticommunist 
public opinion and the EU’s Holocaust memory culture, 
the Holocaust paradigm only functions as a model for 
adaptation as far as it concerns the narrative of trauma 
and victimhood, whereas the message is completely 
diff erent. One should wish therefore a much more self-
critical and subtle attitude on the perpetrator’s role of 
Holocaust victims and national freedom fi ghters, some 
of whom fought against Soviet and Nazi occupiers as 
well as collaborated with them as perpetrators in the 
context of civil war and ethnic warfare (Lotnik 1999).
Next to ideology, historical complexity confuses the 
paradigm debate. This might be shown by the case 
of Katyn that combines all the above mentioned 
scenarios. The highly contested memorial site at 
Smolensk in Russia (former Polish) became world 
news in 2010 because of the air crash that resulted in 
the death of the Polish president Lech Kaczynski and 
95 members of a Polish delegation on their way to 
the celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the 
massacre. Here the Russian NKVD (the forerunner of 
the KGB) shot approximately 22,000 Polish offi  cers after 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1940, of which 4,500 
are buried in three mass graves (Sanford 2005). Ever 
since the Germans discovered the pits in 1943 and let 
the corpses be inspected by an international war crime 
committee Katyn functioned as a horrible example of 
the Bolshevik ‘Red Danger’ in Nazi war propaganda.
As might be expected, the communists blamed the 
Germans for wartime propaganda, and responded 
after the War with counter-memorials. Thus in 1969 in 
the Belarus village of Khatyn (Chatyn), a few hundred 
kilometers from ‘Polish’ Katyn, the Soviet Union built a 
memorial for the Nazi massacre of the 149 inhabitants 
of this Belarusian village. Interestingly, with president 
Boris Yeltsin’s ‘second destalinization’ the Russian 
government accepted guilt to the Katyn massacre in 
1990, after which documents were handed over to the 
Polish president Lech Walesa, and treaties signed. From 
then a binational Polish-Russian memorial remembers 
both the Polish and Russian victims of Stalinist terror.
Although the present place looks like an idyllic park in 
a forest, with four great mounds, the Katyn memorial 
during the last decades did not really function as a 
place of reconciliation. In 2010 the new Polish president 
Komoraswki and Russia’s president Dmitri Medvedev 
commemorated here together the air-crash deaths 
and the victims of the Katyn massacre. Yet the Russian 
recognition of Stalin’s guilt to the massacre was based 
on the acceptance of at about 1,800 Polish people killed, 
without classifying Katyin as war crime or genocide. 
Besides, Russian historians point to a contextualization 
of the ‘dark site’ of the Katyn massacre by putting it 
into the context of the earlier Polish outrage of 1920–21, 
when during the Russian civil war of Red and White 
armies, ten thousands of Red Army prisoners starved 
in Polish camps near Warsaw whereas, as we saw, three 
million Russian war prisoners died in German camps. 
In this highly politicized climate even the online 
publication in 2010 of the documents of March 5th 
1940, confi rming the massacre was to be carried out on 
Stalin’s and Beria’s orders, did not stop the questioning 
of archival sources, or the German  cartridge cases 
found on the spot, which suggested the possibility of a 
Nazi cover-up. However, just as in the case of the bullet 
Holocaust people started talking after the opening 
of the Russian archives about the locations of Stalin’s 
Great Terror and the NKVD prison massacres of 1941. The 
last one numbering almost 9,000 in Ukraine (Berkhoff  
2004, 14), whereas the Kurapaty massacre near Minsk, 
numbering 200 graves in the forest, has been estimated 
as with from 30,000 up to 250,000 victims (according to 
Norman Davis in 2004). Yet of them only fi ve people 
are identifi ed because in this case no earlier research 
has been carried out and no NKVD archives have been 
found (Kaminska 2011).
Yet behind every fact politics are at stake. This was after 
all a war starting in 1939 with a staged ‘Polish’ attack 
on a German radio station of German soldiers in Polish 
uniforms and dead injected German political prisoners 
‘playing’ Polish victims. A scenario directed by Himmler 
and Heydrich, which off ered Hitler a pretext to 
legitimate his Polish invasion (Breitman 1991, 66). Thus 
the American Slavic scholar Irina Paperno wondered 
in the case of the Ukrainian Vinnytsia massacre of 
1937–8 (9,400 deaths) about the uncritical use of 1943 
German documents and photos, handed over to the 
international war crime commission – just like in Katyn. 
Because no later forensic or archaeological research 
has been carried out, postwar Ukrainian refugees, 
American historians, and Kyiv Memorial researchers of 
the 1990s, all relied on these same sources. Strangely, 
no-one questioned the Nazis manipulation of data to 
proof a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy by neglecting to 
include in propaganda the Jewish and Russian victims, 
mentioned in the original documents,  nor the ordered 
ethnic identifi cation of NKVD perpetrators as ‘Jews’ 
(Paperno 2002). Whereas these reports objectifi ed Nazi 
propaganda so to speak, new memory wars are started, 
however, by neo-Nazis on the internet, suggesting an 
American-Jewish conspiracy for silencing the ethnic 
component of Vinnytsia as the Ukrainian Katyn: ‘The 
Jews own all of those media. And the Ukrainians don’t 
own Hollywood, so they can’t make movie dramas 
about Vinnitsa either, like Steven Spielberg does about 
the so-called “Holocaust” (Pierce 1998). This should 
warn us that digging deeper may reveal the truth as 
much as it might feed new myths!
To conclude
As the topography of terror did have a much deeper 
imprint in Eastern Europe than generally thought in the 
West, the European expansion in Eastern direction will 
result, without doubt, in a further transformation of the 
EU’s politics of memory.
For Western Europe might be overshadowed by 
Auschwitz, Oswiecim is still in Poland (Citroen & 
Starzynska 2011). Yet even in Old Europe, with its 
growing Euroscepticism, one might expect a reduced 
support for the ‘Holocaust-centered European 
mnemonic community’ in the nearby future (Kansteiner 
2006). With regard to this fundamental relocation of 
memory, even small confl icts about painful heritage 
and traumatic memories run the risk of ending up in 
a clash of cultures. Thus against the assumption of 
the Holocaust as a common European experience I 
would pose the prospect of Holocaust dissonances. 
But memory wars and paradigm confl icts should, 
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in my view, not be resolved by top-down European 
declarations and legal procedures. Instead we should 
search for new interpretations of diff erent, if not 
opposing, European experiences, and a fundamental 
rethinking of Holocaust history, memory and heritage, 
to be grasped from a transnational comparative 
perspective.
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